Consequences

 

 

We've come so far...

We are a long way from the question that kicked off this quest: the question of how to define knowledge. We are currently knee-deep in ethical theories, and some might be puzzled as to how we got here. The primary reason for our survey of ethical theories is to explore the idea of moral realism. Moral realism, the view that there is an objective right and wrong, is—at least intuitively—only tenable if coupled with something like (libertarian) free will. In other words, moral realism only makes sense if we have something like libertarian free will. I didn't really justify this "coupling" of moral realism and (libertarian) free will when I presented the idea. But after seeing the work of Kant, I hope you can now see that moral realism, belief in God, and certainty about the world seem to form a worldview that various thinkers subscribed to.

Why do we want to defend libertarian free will? Well, besides the obvious reason that it'd be nice to have it, many of our beliefs and institutions implicitly assume libertarian free will. For example, does voting really make much sense without libertarian free will? How about income inequality? How about capital punishment? It's hard to tell. My colleague David Reed has made the case to me that, in Political Science, libertarian free will must simply be assumed. This, however, is not a political science class. It could very well be the case that none of those aforementioned institutions really make sense, in light of modern science. The views of great thinkers, like Aristotle, have fallen after a millennium-long reign. Why should ideas from political science be any different?

More than anything, though, in this class we have been trying to defend the Cartesian foundationalist project. Descartes thought he could reconcile science and faith, and his system utilizes the existence of God as the way to disprove skepticism. Since we cannot take the existence of God for granted, we explored arguments for and against God's existence. The main argument against God's existence was the Problem of Evil, and so we tried to solve it. One of the most popular proposed solutions is the free will solution, and that is why we are here.

We are six dilemmas into this quest. Today we come to know the seventh.

Kant v. the Utilitarians

Typically in an introductory ethics course, the view we learned about in the last lesson is taught in tandem with the view we are covering today: Utilitarianism (in particular the version of Utilitarianism advocated by John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873). I tried to move away from that while introducing Kantianism, but now that we are moving towards Utilitarianism, it's impossible to hide just how antagonistic these two views are to each other. It sometimes seems they are almost exact opposites in their approach to moral reasoning, and they disagree on almost every ethical issue of great import.

Why is this? There are many reasons. First, as you will learn in the Important Concepts, the Utilitarians are explicit moral naturalists. This is simply the view that moral properties are just natural properties (physical things we can see, touch, and/or study through standard scientific methods), and it is a central tenet of Utilitarianism. They're not commands from God or social constructs, like the law. Instead, moral properties are empirically discoverable, i.e., capable of being studied by science. How? Utilitarians believe that the moral property GOOD just is a positive mental state, namely pleasure. Pleasure, of course, is a natural phenomenon.¹

Moreover, once they've opened up the natural realm as candidate for moral properties, they argue that positive mental states, hereafter referred to as utility, are actually the only intrinsic good. This view is called hedonism. This is where their empirical approach comes in handy to them: they pose a challenge to non-Utilitarians. What do you really want other than happiness (or the avoidance of pain, i.e., negative mental states)? The more "base" desires are obviously linked to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; I'm speaking here of things like sex and food. You might then claim you want a good job, a family, and a house. But the Utilitarian would only inquire further, "Why do you want that?" Ultimately, you'd have to concede that having a bad job (or no job), no family, and no home would be considerably damaging to your mental wellbeing. Having them, however, would make you happy. Pretty much anything you desire, the Utilitarian can find a way to show you that ultimately there is a desire for the utility that it brings you. This is why Mill considers hedonism to be an empirical truth: you can discover that this is what really drives people by just asking them. That is, check the drives of humans, and you'll find that hedonism is true.

But the component of Utilitarianism that really puts it at odds with Kantianism is consequentialism. Recall that consequentialism is the view that an act is right or wrong depending on the consequences of that action. Kantianism, on the other hand, specifically stipulates that you need not check the empirical realm. The moral law must be transcendental, independent of context, argues Kant. This might seem like a small difference now, but you'll soon see that this puts these two theories worlds apart.

Making room...

Mill does not only differentiate his view from that of Kant; he also goes after other ethical theories. As you can see in his quote above, he argues that virtue theory doesn't hold any weight since it doesn't give the right theory of moral value. He claims that those who pursue virtue for its own sake are actually just pursuing pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Similarly, Mill goes after social contract theory. While reviewing the problems of past approaches to moral reasoning, Mill argues that social contract theory merely put a bandaid on the whole matter by inventing the notion of a contract. But he dismisses the theory outright. You'll get a better idea of why in the next section.

Important Concepts

 

The Theory

The Formula

The theory itself is simple. The Principle of Utility is derived by combining hedonism and consequentialism. It is as follows: An act is morally right if, and only if, it maximizes happiness/pleasure and/or minimizes pain for all persons involved.

Who counts as a person?

Here's another point of contention with Kantianism. Where as Kant believe that personhood, i.e. moral rights, are assigned to anyone who is a Rational Being, i.e. able to live according to principles, Mill believed that all sentient creatures deserve rights. Sentience is the capacity to feel pleasure and pain.²

Subordinate Rules

Mill also endorses subordinate rules, or what we might call “common sense morality.” This is because it is unfeasible to always perform a Utilitarian calculus when making a moral decision in your day to day life. In any case, according to Mill, these are rules that tend to promote happiness. They’ve been learned through the experience of many generations, and so we should internalize them as good rules to follow. These rules include: "Keep your promises", "Don’t cheat", "Don’t steal", "Obey the Law", "Don’t kill innocents", etc. However, note that if it is clear that breaking a subordinate rule would yield more happiness than keeping it, you should break said subordinate rule.

 

Famous Utilitarians

Perhaps you can figure out how you feel about Utilitarianism by reflecting on some famous figures who at least seemed to have been using utilitarian moral reasoning.

 

 

Decoding Utilitarianism

 

Objections (Recap)

Thought-experiments

Various thinkers have proposed thought-experiments that show that there is something counterintuitive about Utilitarianism. Enjoy the slideshow below:

 

 

Challenging moral naturalism

Some thinkers have challenged the utilitarian naturalist assumption that the moral property of moral goodness could be equated with the natural properties of positive mental states. In Ethica Principia, G.E. Moore argued for moral non-naturalism, the view that moral properties cannot be studied with the natural sciences. He used various arguments (such as the naturalistic fallacy argument, which many think was insufficient), but the open question argument is the most often referenced. The argument goes something like this. If “good” just means “pleasure”, then we can express it like an identity claim.

Eg,
BACHELOR = UNMARRIED MALE
GOOD = PLEASURE

But it doesn’t seem like asking “Is a bachelor an unmarried male?” is the same as “Is good the same as pleasure?” The first is a silly question. But the second requires an argument.

Even moral skeptics, individuals who question whether there are any objective moral values (like someone who endorses DCT atheist version), are unimpressed by moral naturalism. Richard Joyce, a prominent moral skeptic, doesn't see the appeal in equating moral goodness with mental states. Clearly, this is an issue we'll have to revisit.

The theory is too demanding...

Lastly, just like some object that Kantianism is too strict, some object that Utilitarianism is far too demanding. Consider the most famous case...

What now?

Utilitarianism, to many, is simultaneously the most plausible ethical theory and, paradoxically, the most dangerous one, i.e., the most likely to be misapplied. As they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Now that we've looked at several ethical theories, we should take a look around and look at the mess we've made.

We've seen an ethical theory that relies on the view that it is human nature to behave in self-interested ways (Hobbes' social contract theory). We've also looked at a view that claims that it is our culture which determines what is right and wrong for us (cultural moral relativism). We looked at Kantianism and utilitarianism, theories which dragged us into their centuries-long war, where deontology (a duty-oriented, rule-based approach to morality) and consequentialism face-off against each other. There's also views we didn't cover, like Aristotle's approach (known as virtue theory) which charges that good behavior is actually rooted in our dispositions to act (i.e., our virtues); and so we must train ourselves to behave well by developing certain virtues. There's also divine command theory: the view that act is right or wrong depending on God's commands. All of these views are intuitive in some sense, but many (if not all) are incompatible with each other. What do we do?

Remember: we only got into this mess to save (libertarian) free will. So let's assess these views through that lens. First off, it's not clear that all of these views are compatible with libertarianism. Divine command theory includes God, and we've seen in the problem of divine foreknowledge that it isn't clear that the notions of God and (libertarian) free will are compatible. It doesn't look like psychological egoism, which is a primary assumption in Hobbes' social contract theory, is compatible with (libertarian) free will either. If all we can do is behave in our own self-interest, then we are not free to not behave in our own self-interest. (Let me remind you that Hobbes' himself was a compatibilist.) Cultural moral relativism is pretty much orthogonal (i.e., philosophically independent) of free will. It's only Aristotle's virtue theory, Kantianism, and Utilitarianism that are unambiguously compatible with libertarianism. Not surprisingly, these three views are (arguably) different forms of moral realism. So, if we want to continue to defend the Cartesian project, we'd (most likely) have to defend one of these views. Going with divine command theory and fixing the problem of divine foreknowledge is another option.

This is easier said than done, however. It is true that, per Bourget and Chalmers 2014, these are the most popular ethical theories. But just because they (potentially) fit with the Cartesian worldview, that doesn't make them correct. We still need an argument against psychological egoism (solving Dilemma #5), as well as an argument against cultural relativism (solving Dilemma #6). And even if we had those, Kantianism and Utilitarianism—the two theories most subscribed to—are clearly incompatible. We'd have to choose one and argue against the other. That is, we'd have to solve Dilemma #7: Kantianism or Utilitarianism?

But then again, maybe both Kantianism and Utilitarianism are wrong. Maybe we don't have libertarian free will. Maybe our institutions don't really make sense, and it's a wonder they've worked at all for so long. Maybe there is no God. Maybe there are no solid foundations for knowledge. Maybe, if we look down, we'll realize that the human project has no solid base, that we're teetering on a knife's edge with collapse on both sides. Maybe we're floating in midair. Or maybe, just maybe... we're falling.

FYI

Suggested Reading: John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism

• (Note: Read chapters I & II.)

TL;DR: Crash Course, Utilitarianism

Supplementary Material—

• Video: Julia Markovits, Ethics: Utilitarianism, Part 2

Advanced Material—

• Reading: IEP, Entry on Utilitarianism, Section 3

 

Footnotes

1. I might add that the English word pleasure does not convey the complexity of positive emotions that Mill meant by it. There is, Mill argues, a hierarchy of positive mental states. On the low end you might find the pleasure of sex, the satisfaction of a good meal, or the clarity of mind you have when you are well-rested. On the higher end you might find the fulfillment of a life well-lived or the equanimity of coming to terms with your own mortality. Mill famously put it this way: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

2. I should add here that the meaning of sentience being used here is one of several senses of the word. The word sentience is also used, for example, as a synonym for consciousness, more broadly speaking. We are not using the term in this way. When I use the word sentience it will exclusively refer to the capacity to feel pleasure and pain.